DIGESTS
Remedies (under the NIRC of 1997)
Protest of Assessment & Appeal
The procedure for protesting an assessment deals with remedies, and thus, may be applied retroactively.
The procedure for protesting an assessment under the Tax Code is found in Chapter III of Title VIII, which deals with remedies. Being procedural in nature, can its provision then be applied retroactively? The answer is yes.
The general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. Clearly, Section 228 provides for the procedure in case an assessment is protested. The provision does not create new or take away vested rights. In both instances, it can surely be applied retroactively. Moreover, RA 8424 does not state, either expressly or by necessary implication, that pending actions are excepted from the operation of Section 228, or that applying it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.
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Three (3) options given to a protesting taxpayer.
Following the verba legis doctrine, the law (referring to Section 228, NIRC of 1997; and Section 3.1.5, RR No. 12-99) must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. A textual reading of Section 3.1.5 gives a protesting taxpayer like PAGCOR only three options:
1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest.
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR’s authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest.
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within 180 days from submission of the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period.
To further clarify the three options: A whole or partial denial by the CIR’s authorized representative may be appealed to the CIR or the CTA. A whole or partial denial by the CIR may be appealed to the CTA. The CIR or the CIR’s authorized representative’s failure to act may be appealed to the CTA. There is no mention of an appeal to the CIR from the failure to act by the CIR’s authorized representative.
PAGCOR did not wait for the RD or the CIR’s decision on its protest. PAGCOR made separate and successive filings before the RD and the CIR before it filed its petition with the CTA. We shall illustrate below how PAGCOR failed to follow the clear directive of Section 228 and Section 3.1.5.
PAGCOR’s protest to the RD on 24 January 2008 was filed within the 30-day period prescribed in Section 228 and Section 3.1.5. The RD did not release any decision on PAGCOR’s protest; thus, PAGCOR was unable to make use of the first option as described above to justify an appeal to the CTA. The effect of the lack of decision from the RD is the same, whether we consider PAGCOR’s April 2008 submission of documents or not.
Under the third option described above, even if we grant leeway to PAGCOR and consider its unspecified April 2008 submission, PAGCOR still should have waited for the RD’s decision until 27 October 2008, or 180 days from 30 April 2008. PAGCOR then had 30 days from 27 October 2008, or until 26 November 2008, to file its petition before the CTA. PAGCOR, however, did not make use of the third option. PAGCOR did not file a petition before the CTA on or before 26 November 2008.
Under the second option, PAGCOR ought to have waited for the RD’s whole or partial denial of its protest before it filed an appeal before the CIR. PAGCOR rendered the second option moot when it formulated its own rule and chose to ignore the clear text of Section 3.1.5. PAGCOR “elevated an appeal” to the CIR on 13 August 2008 withoutany decision from the RD, then filed a petition before the CTA on 11 March 2009. A textual reading of Section 228 and Section 3.1.5 will readily show that neither Section 228 nor Section 3.1.5 provides for the remedy of an appeal to the CIR in case of the RD’s failure to act. The third option states that the remedy for failure to act by the CIR or his authorized representative is to file an appeal to the CTA within 30 days after the lapse of 180 days from the submission of the required supporting documents. PAGCOR clearly failed to do this.
If we consider, for the sake of argument, PAGCOR’s submission before the CIR as a separate protest and not as an appeal, then such protest should be denied for having been filed out of time. PAGCOR only had 30 days from 17 January 2008 within which to file its protest. This period ended on 16 February 2008. PAGCOR filed its submission before the CIR on 13 August 2008.
When PAGCOR filed its petition before the CTA, it is clear that PAGCOR failed to make use of any of the three options described above. A petition before the CTA may only be made after a whole or partial denial of the protest by the CIR or the CIR’s authorized representative. When PAGCOR filed its petition before the CTA on 11 March 2009, there was still no denial of PAGCOR’s protest by either the RD or the CIR. Therefore, under the first option, PAGCOR’s petition before the CTA had no cause of action because it was prematurely filed. The CIR made an unequivocal denial of PAGCOR’s protest only on 18 July 2011, when the CIR sought to collect from PAGCOR the amount of P46,589,507.65. The CIR’s denial further puts PAGCOR in a bind, because it can no longer amend its petition before the CTA.
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are [premature]. As this Court eloquently said in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris:
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. As observed by counsel for appellees, there are reasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and why people who are in no default and against whom there is yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. We say groundless because if the action is [premature], it should not be entertained, and an action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.
It is true that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of the originals which are thereby regarded as abandoned (Reynes vs. Compania General de Tabacos [1912], 21 Phil. 416; Ruyman and Farris vs. Director of Lands [1916], 34 Phil. 428) and that “the complaint and answer having been superseded by the amended complaint and answer thereto, and the answer to the original complaint not having been presented in evidence as an exhibit, the trial court was not authorized to take it into account.” (Bastida vs. Menzi & Co. [1933], 58 Phil. 188.) But in none of these cases or in any other case have we held that if a right of action did not exist when the original complaint was filed, one could be created by filing an amended complaint. In some jurisdictions in the United States what was termed an “imperfect cause of action” could be perfected by suitable amendment (Brown vs. Galena Mining & Smelting Co., 32 Kan., 528; Hooper vs. City of Atlanta, 26 Ga. App., 221) and this is virtually permitted in Banzon and Rosauro vs. Sellner ([1933], 58 Phil. 453); Asiatic Potroleum [sic] Co. vs. Veloso ([1935], 62 Phil. 683); and recently in Ramos vs. Gibbon (38 Off. Gaz. 241). That, however, which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a cause of action: Nihil de re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quandojus accresceret habet.
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible. (Italics ours)
PAGCOR has clearly failed to comply with the requisites in disputing an assessment as provided by Section 228 and Section 3.1.5. Indeed, PAGCOR’s lapses in procedure have made the BIR’s assessment final, executory and demandable, thus obviating the need to further discuss the issue of the propriety of imposition of fringe benefits tax.
N.B.: The foregoing disposition was based on the original provisions of RR No. 12-99, i.e., prior to the latter’s amendments.
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When the assessment becomes final, unappealable, and demandable.
Sec. 229 of the Code (now Section 228 of the NIRC of 1997) mandates that a request for reconsideration must be made within 30 days from the taxpayer’s receipt of the tax deficiency assessment, otherwise the assessment becomes final, unappealable and, therefore, demandable. The notice of assessment for respondent’s tax deficiency was issued by petitioner on July 18, 1986. On the other hand, respondent made her request for reconsideration thereof only on November 3, 1992, without stating when she received the notice of tax assessment. She explained that she was constrained to ask for a reconsideration in order to avoid the harassment of BIR collectors. In all likelihood, she must have been referring to the distraint and levy of her properties by petitioner’s agents which took place on January 12, 1989. Even assuming that she first learned of the deficiency assessment on this date, her request for reconsideration was nonetheless filed late since she made it more than 30 days thereafter. Hence, her request for reconsideration did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period provided under §223(c) (now Section 228 of the NIRC of 1997). Although the Commissioner acted on her request by eventually denying it on August 11, 1994, this is of no moment and does not detract from the fact that the assessment had long become demandable.
~~~Republic of the Philippines vs. Hizon (G.R. No. 130430, 13 December 1999, 2nd Div., J. Mendoza)
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A request for reconsideration must be made within thirty (30) days from the taxpayer’s receipt of the tax deficiency assessment, otherwise, the decision becomes final, unappealable and therefore, demandable. A tax assessment that has become final, executory and enforceable for failure of the taxpayer to assail the same as provided in Section 228 can no longer be contested
Here, petitioner failed to avail of its right to bring the matter before the CTA within the reglementary period upon the receipt of the demand letter reiterating the assessed delinquent taxes and denying its request for reconsideration which constituted the final determination by the BIR on petitioner’s protest. Being a final disposition by said agency, the same would have been a proper subject for appeal to the CTA.
The rule is that for the CTA to acquire jurisdiction, an assessment must first be disputed by the taxpayer and ruled upon by the CIR to warrant a decision from which a petition for review may be taken to the CTA. Where an adverse ruling has been rendered by the CIR with reference to a disputed assessment or a claim for refund or credit, the taxpayer may appeal the same within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof.
We agree with the factual findings of the CTA that the demand letter may be presumed to have been duly directed, mailed and was received by petitioner in the regular course of the mail in the absence of evidence to the contrary. This is in accordance with Section 2(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, and in this case, since the period to appeal has commenced to run from the time the letter of demand was presumably received by petitioner within a reasonable time after January 24, 1991, the period of thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse decision on the request for reconsideration had already lapsed when the petition was filed with the CTA only on November 8, 1991. Hence, the CTA properly dismissed the petition as the tax delinquency assessment had long become final and executory.
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An assessment becomes final and unappealable if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment, the taxpayer fails to file his or her protest requesting for reconsideration or reinvestigation as provided in Section 229 of the NIRC (now Section 228, NIRC of 1997).
The CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the CIR in cases involving disputed assessments.
The CTA, being a court of special jurisdiction, can take cognizance only of matters that are clearly within its jurisdiction. Section 7 of RA 9282 provides:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
The word “decisions” in the above quoted provision of RA 9282 has been interpreted to mean the decisions of the CIR on the protest of the taxpayer against the assessments. Corollary thereto, Section 228 of the NIRC provides for the procedure for protesting an assessment. It states:
SECTION 228. Protesting of Assessment. – When the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings: Provided, however, That a preassessment notice shall not be required in the following cases:
(a) When the finding for any deficiency tax is the result of mathematical error in the computation of the tax as appearing on the face of the return; or
(b) When a discrepancy has been determined between the tax withheld and the amount actually remitted by the withholding agent; or
(c) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or tax credit of excess creditable withholding tax for a taxable period was determined to have carried over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated tax liabilities for the taxable quarter or quarters of the succeeding taxable year; or
(d) When the excise tax due on excisable articles has not been paid; or
(e) When an article locally purchased or imported by an exempt person, such as, but not limited to, vehicles, capital equipment, machineries and spare parts, has been sold, traded or transferred to non-exempt persons.
The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made; otherwise, the assessment shall be void.
Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable.
In the instant case, petitioner timely filed a protest after receiving the PAN. In response thereto, the BIR issued a Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices. Pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC, the proper recourse of petitioner was to dispute the assessments by filing an administrative protest within 30 days from receipt thereof. Petitioner, however, did not protest the final assessment notices. Instead, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. Thus, if we strictly apply the rules, the dismissal of the Petition for Review by the CTA was proper.
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Direct appeal to the CTA in case the request for reconsideration remains unacted upon for 180 days.
Section 228 of the NIRC states that a delinquent taxpayer may nevertheless directly appeal a disputed assessment, if its request for reconsideration remains unacted upon 180 days after submission thereof.
In this case, the said period of 180 days had already lapsed when respondent filed its request for reconsideration on March 23, 1990, without any action on the part of the CIR.
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The 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is jurisdictional.
The thirty (30) day period is jurisdictional.
Failure to comply with the thirty-day statutory period would bar appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction to entertain and determine the correctness of the assessment.
~~~Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. West Pacific Corp. (G.R. No. L-18804, 27 May 1965, En Banc, J. Paredes)
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Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the negligence of petitioner’s counsel is excusable, still the petition must fail. As aptly observed by the OSG, even if the petition for relief from judgment would be granted, petitioner will not fare any better if the case were to be returned to the CTA Second Division since its action for the cancellation of its assessments had already prescribed.
Petitioner protested the assessments pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment.- x x x.
x x x x
Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (Emphasis supplied)
The CTA Second Division held:
Following the periods provided for in the aforementioned laws, from July 20, 2001, that is, the date of petitioner’s filing of protest, it had until September 18, 2001 to submit relevant documents and from September 18, 2001, the Commissioner had until March 17, 2002 to issue his decision. As admitted by petitioner, the protest remained unacted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Therefore, it had until April 16, 2002 within which to elevate the case to this court. Thus, when petitioner filed its Petition for Review on April 30, 2002, the same is outside the thirty (30) period.
As provided in Section 228, the failure of a taxpayer to appeal from an assessment on time rendered the assessment final, executory and demandable. Consequently, petitioner is precluded from disputing the correctness of the assessment.
In Ker & Company, Ltd. v. Court of Tax Appeals (G.R. No. L-12396, 31 January 1962), the Court held that while the right to appeal a decision of the Commissioner to the CTA is merely a statutory remedy, nevertheless the requirement that it must be brought within 30 days is jurisdictional. If a statutory remedy provides as a condition precedent that the action to enforce it must be commenced within a prescribed time, such requirement is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith may be raised in a motion to dismiss.
In fine, the failure to comply with the 30-day statutory period would bar the appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction to entertain and determine the correctness of the assessment.
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The 30-day period is not tolled by the filing of a motion of reconsideration of the denial of the administrative protest.
Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that an assessment
x x x may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner’s administrative protest was denied by Final Decision on Disputed Assessment dated August 2, 2005 issued by respondent and which petitioner received on August 4, 2005. Under the above-quoted Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code, petitioner had 30 days to appeal respondent’s denial of its protest to the CTA.
Since petitioner received the denial of its administrative protest on August 4, 2005, it had until September 3, 2005 to file a petition for review before the CTA Division. It filed one, however, on October 20, 2005, hence, it was filed out of time. For a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the administrative protest does not toll the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA.
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The 30-day period to appeal is not merely directory but mandatory and it is beyond the power of the courts to extend the same; The options to file a petition for review or to await the CIR’s decision on disputed assessment are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the other.
Petitioner’s failure to file a petition for review with the CTA within the statutory period rendered the disputed assessment final, executory and demandable, thereby precluding it from interposing the defenses of legality or validity of the assessment and prescription of the Government’s right to assess.
The CTA is a court of special jurisdiction and can only take cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. Section 7 of RA No. 9282, amending RA No. 1125, otherwise known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
Also, Section 3, Rule 4 and Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals state:
RULE 4
Jurisdiction of the Court
x x x x
SECTION 3. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions. — The Court in Divisions shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action: Provided, that in case of disputed assessments, the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case to the Court and does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the tax case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the one hundred eighty day-period abovementioned, the taxpayer may appeal such final decision to the Court under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided, still further, that in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review with the Court prior to the expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
x x x x
RULE 8
Procedure in Civil Cases
x x x x
SECTION 3. Who May Appeal; Period to File Petition. — (a) A party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, or a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may appeal to the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed by law for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. In case of inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on claims for refund of internal revenue taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review within the two-year period prescribed by law from payment or collection of the taxes. (n)
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the CTA has been expanded to include not only decisions or rulings but inaction as well of the CIR. The decisions, rulings or inaction of the Commissioner are necessary in order to vest the CTA with jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, provided it is filed within 30 days after the receipt of such decision or ruling, or within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period fixed by law for the Commissioner to act on the disputed assessments. This 30-day period within which to file an appeal is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith would bar the appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction to entertain and determine the correctness of the assessments. Such period is not merely directory but mandatory and it is beyond the power of the courts to extend the same.
In case the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within the 180-day period from date of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: 1) file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or 2) await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessments and appeal such final decision to the CTA within 30 days after receipt of a copy of such decision. However, these options are mutually exclusive, and resort to one bars the application of the other.
In the instant case, the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within 180 days from date of submission of documents. Thus, petitioner opted to file a petition for review before the CTA. Unfortunately, the petition for review was filed out of time, i.e., it was filed more than 30 days after the lapse of the 180-day period. Consequently, it was dismissed by the Court of Tax Appeals for late filing. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or make an appeal; hence, the disputed assessment became final, demandable and executory.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner can not now claim that the disputed assessment is not yet final as it remained unacted upon by the Commissioner; that it can still await the final decision of the Commissioner and thereafter appeal the same to the CTA. This legal maneuver cannot be countenanced. After availing the first option, i.e., filing a petition for review which was however filed out of time, petitioner can not successfully resort to the second option, i.e., awaiting the final decision of the Commissioner and appealing the same to the CTA, on the pretext that there is yet no final decision on the disputed assessment because of the Commissioner’s inaction.
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Section 228 of the NIRC is instructional as to the remedies of a taxpayer in case of the inaction of the Commissioner on the protested assessment, to wit:
SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. – x x x
x x x x
Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations.
Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent, however, insists that in case of the inaction by the Commissioner on the protested assessment within the 180-day reglementary period, petitioner should have appealed the inaction to the CTA. Respondent maintains that due to Lascona’s failure to file an appeal with the CTA after the lapse of the 180-day period, the assessment became final and executory.
We do not agree.
In RCBC v. CIR, the Court has held that in case the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within the 180-day period from date of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: (1) file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessments and appeal such final decision to the CTA within 30 days after receipt of a copy of such decision.
This is consistent with Section 3 A (2), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, to wit:
SEC. 3. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions. – The Court in Divisions shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action: Provided, that in case of disputed assessments, the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of the National Internal revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case to the Court and does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the tax case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the one hundred eighty day-period abovementioned, the taxpayer may appeal such final decision to the Court under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided, still further, that in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review with the Court prior to the expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(Emphasis ours)
In arguing that the assessment became final and executory by the sole reason that petitioner failed to appeal the inaction of the Commissioner within 30 days after the 180-day reglementary period, respondent, in effect, limited the remedy of Lascona, as a taxpayer, under Section 228 of the NIRC to just one, that is – to appeal the inaction of the Commissioner on its protested assessment after the lapse of the 180-day period. This is incorrect.
As early as the case of CIR v. Villa [130 Phil. 3 (1968)], it was already established that the word “decisions” in paragraph 1, Section 7 of RA No. 1125, quoted above, has been interpreted to mean the decisions of the CIR on the protest of the taxpayer against the assessments. Definitely, said word does not signify the assessment itself. We quote what this Court said aptly in a previous case:
In the first place, we believe the respondent court erred in holding that the assessment in question is the respondent Collector’s decision or ruling appealable to it, and that consequently, the period of thirty days prescribed by section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 within which petitioner should have appealed to the respondent court must be counted from its receipt of said assessment. Where a taxpayer questions an assessment and asks the Collector to reconsider or cancel the same because he (the taxpayer) believes he is not liable therefor, the assessment becomes a “disputed assessment” that the Collector must decide, and the taxpayer can appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals only upon receipt of the decision of the Collector on the disputed assessment, . . .
Therefore, as in Section 228, when the law provided for the remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did not intend to limit it to a single remedy of filing of an appeal after the lapse of the 180-day prescribed period. Precisely, when a taxpayer protested an assessment, he naturally expects the CIR to decide either positively or negatively. A taxpayer cannot be prejudiced if he chooses to wait for the final decision of the CIR on the protested assessment. More so, because the law and jurisprudence have always contemplated a scenario where the CIR will decide on the protested assessment.
It must be emphasized, however, that in case of the inaction of the CIR on the protested assessment, while we reiterate – the taxpayer has two options, either: (1) file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment and appeal such final decision to the CTA within 30 days after the receipt of a copy of such decision, these options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the other.
Accordingly, considering that Lascona opted to await the final decision of the Commissioner on the protested assessment, it then has the right to appeal such final decision to the Court by filing a petition for review within thirty days after receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, even after the expiration of the 180-day period fixed by law for the CIR to act on the disputed assessments. Thus, Lascona, when it filed an appeal on April 12, 1999 before the CTA, after its receipt of the Letter dated March 3, 1999 on March 12, 1999, the appeal was timely made as it was filed within 30 days after receipt of the copy of the decision.
Finally, the CIR should be reminded that taxpayers cannot be left in quandary by its inaction on the protested assessment. It is imperative that the taxpayers are informed of its action in order that the taxpayer should then at least be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. As correctly pointed out by the tax court:
x x x to adopt the interpretation of the respondent will not only sanction inefficiency, but will likewise condone the Bureau’s inaction. This is especially true in the instant case when despite the fact that respondent found petitioner’s arguments to be in order, the assessment will become final, executory and demandable for petitioner’s failure to appeal before us within the thirty (30) day period.
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When the CIR claims that the appeal of the taxpayer was filed out of time, the latter must show proof of receipt by the latter.
The OSG relies heavily on the letter dated February 5, 1992—that it was a “final decision” denying Citytrust’s protest. Citytrust’s failure to appeal the “final decision” within 30 days from receipt thereof rendered the tax assessment final, executory, and unappealable. Thus, BPI’s Second CTA petition in 2011 was filed out of time, over which the court below did not acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s reasoning is specious and misplaced.
This was the CIR’s same argument in the 2018 Case. To recall, the Court did not give evidentiary weight to the letter dated February 5, 1992 due to the CIR’s failure to prove Citytrust’s receipt thereof. In the present case, not only is there still no proof of receipt. The CIR did not even attach a copy of the letter relied upon to the present petition. Notably, failure to append “material portions of the record as would support the petition” is a ground for dismissal thereof.
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When an appeal filed beyond the 30-day period may be allowed.
Section 228 of the 1997 NIRC … provides for the remedies of a taxpayer in case of an adverse final decision by the CIR on Disputed Assessment.
It bears to stress that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to do so renders the questioned decision or decree final and executory and no longer subject to review.
In the instant case, petitioner allegedly failed to observe the 30-day period within which to appeal the final decision of the CIR to the CTA. As records would show, petitioner admittedly received the FDDA on March 28, 2011. Reckoned from this date of receipt, it has until April27, 2011, within which to appeal with the CTA. However, petitioner filed its appeal (Petition for Review) only on July 26, 2011 or after the lapse of ninety-three (93) days from its receipt of the FDDA. It appears that petitioner’s filing of an appeal with the CTA was beyond the statutory period to appeal.
Nonetheless, this Court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. We have on several instances allowed the filing of an appeal outside the period prescribed by law in the interest of justice, and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus:
x x x [F]or a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court’s suspension of the rules. Indeed, the Court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted) [Trans International v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 830 (1998)]
Petitioner averred that after receiving the Amended Assessment Notice and the FDDA of the CIR on March 28, 2011, it filed, without the assistance of a counsel, a letter protesting the Amended Assessment Notice, with Regional Director Mr. Jaime B. Santiago, of RDO No. 049, Makati City. This letter of protest was filed by petitioner on April 11, 2011 or within the statutory period within which to appeal. Apparently, petitioner was merely relying on the statement in the said Amended Assessment Notice, which reads:
IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, FILE YOUR PROTEST IN WRITING INDICATING YOUR REASONS WITH THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, BIR DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY OR THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF: x x x
Thus, petitioner opted to file the protest with the Regional Director. On May 12, 2011, petitioner received a letter informing it that its filing of a letter of protest was an improper remedy. Therefore, petitioner, on May 27, 2011, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of mistake in good faith for relying on the statement provided in the Amended Assessment Notice. Petitioner contends that the CTA En Banc should have taken into consideration that the filing of the Petition for Relief from Judgment has stopped the running of the period to appeal. Petitioner insists that all of these incidents constitute excusable delay that justified its belated filing of an appeal with the CTA.
We sustain petitioner’s argument.
When petitioner sent a letter-reply dated April 8, 2011 to the Regional Director, it was actually protesting both the Amended Assessment Notice and the FDDA. The Amended Assessment Notice reflects the amended deficiency EWT of petitioner after reinvestigation while the FDDA reflects the Final Decision on: (a) petitioner’s deficiency EWT; (b) Final Withholding of VAT; and (c) Compromise Penalty. Since the deficiency EWT is a mere component of the aggregate tax due as reflected in the FDDA, then the FDDA cannot be considered as the final decision of the CIR as one of its components – the amended deficiency EWT – is still under protest.
Petitioner was correct when it protested with the Regional Director the deficiency EWT as per the Amended Assessment Notice sent by the BIR. However, instead of resolving the protest, the Regional Director informed the petitioner that it was an improper remedy. A ruling totally inconsistent with the statement reflected in the Amended Assessment Notice, which states that protest must be filed with the CIR or the Regional Director within 30 days from receipt thereof. Apparently, the Regional Director has hastily presumed that petitioner was already protesting the FDDA, which incidentally was received by petitioner on the same date as that of the Amended Assessment Notice.
With petitioner’s pending protest with the Regional Director on the amended EWT, then technically speaking, there was yet no final decision that was issued by the CIR that is appealable to the CTA. It is still incumbent for the Regional Director to act upon the protest on the amended EWT- whether to grant or to deny it. Only when the CIR settled (deny/grant) the protest on the deficiency EWT could there be a final decision on petitioner’s liabilities. And only when there is a final decision of the CIR, would the prescriptive period to appeal with the CTA begin to run.
Hence, petitioner’s belated filing of an appeal with the CTA is not without strong, compelling reason. We could say that petitioner was merely exhausting all administrative remedies available before seeking recourse to the judicial courts. While the rule is that a taxpayer has 30 days to appeal to the CTA from the final decision of the CIR, the said rule could not be applied if the Assessment Notice itself clearly states that the taxpayer must file a protest with the CIR or the Regional Director within 30 days from receipt of the Assessment Notice. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we opted not to apply the statutory period within which to appeal with the CTA considering that no final decision yet was issued by the CIR on petitioner’s protest. The subsequent appeal taken by petitioner is from the inaction of the CIR on its protest.
In this case, petitioner’s appeal with the CTA was basically anchored on two points of contention, to wit: (a) the BIR’s assessment of EWT which has no basis in fact and in law. Petitioner argues that it is not a top 10,000 Corporation, hence, not all its purchases are subject to the 1% and 2% EWT; and (b) the withholding of the VAT on royalty payments for the software application it purchased from a non-resident foreign corporation. Petitioner argues that it is only a reseller (engaged in the buy and sell) of Microsoft products and not a licensor. Thus, the income payments made to Microsoft do not constitute royalty income subject to withholding VAT but merely a business income. It maintained that even RMC No. 44-2005 issued by the BIR on September 7, 2005 does not consider payments for computer software as royalties but business income. And lastly, petitioner argues that RMC No. 7-2003 issued on November 18, 2003, which was relied upon by the BIR in assessing it with deficiency withholding tax on VAT on royalties, does not expressly state when it would take effect. Thus, petitioner opined that it cannot be given retroactive effect (to cover its case), otherwise, it will impose liabilities not existing at the time of its passage.
If petitioner’s right to appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that it had belatedly filed its appeal, then this Court as the final arbiter of justice would be deserting its avowed objective, that is to dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not on a mere technicality.
Since the CTA First Division has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CIR on disputed assessment it is just proper to remand the case to it in order to determine whether petitioner is indeed liable to pay the deficiency withholding tax on VAT on royalties. It should be noted that the CTA has developed an expertise on the subject of taxation because it is a specialized court dedicated exclusively to the study and resolution of tax problems. Thus, this Court has no jurisdiction to review tax cases at the first instance without first letting the CTA study and resolve the same.
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An option not to appeal the CIR’s inaction over sa disputed assessment.
Section 228 of the Tax Code amended Section 229 of the Old Tax Code by adding, among others, the 180-day rule. This new provision presumably avoids the situation in the past when a taxpayer would be held hostage by the Commissioner’s inaction on his or her protest. Under the Old Tax Code, in conjunction with Section 11 of RA No. 1125, only the decision or ruling of the Commissioner on a disputed assessment is appealable to the CTA. Consequently, the taxpayer then had to wait for the Commissioner’s action on his or her protest, which more often was long-delayed. With the amendment introduced by RA No. 8424, the taxpayer may now immediately appeal to the CTA in case of inaction of the Commissioner for 180 days from submission of supporting documents.
RA No. 9282, or the new CTA Law, which took effect on April 23, 2004, amended RA No. 1125 and included a provision complementing Section 228 of the Tax Code, as follows:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
. . . .
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 7(a)(2) above, it is expressly provided that the “inaction” of the Commissioner on his or her failure to decide a disputed assessment within 180 days is “deemed a denial” of the protest.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. CIR, this Court, by way of an obiter, ruled as follows:
In case the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within the 180-day period from the date of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: 1) file a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or 2) await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment and appeal such final decision to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days after receipt of a copy of such decision. However, these options are mutually exclusive, and resort to one bars the application of the other.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within 180 days from date of submission of documents. Thus, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation opted to file a Petition for Review before the CTA. Unfortunately, it was filed more than 30 days following the lapse of the 180-day period. Consequently, it was dismissed by the CTA for late filing. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or make an appeal; hence, the disputed assessment became final and executory.
Subsequently, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, but this was denied by the CTA for lack of merit. This Court affirmed the CTA. It further held that even if the negligence of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation’s counsel was excusable and the petition for relief from judgment would be granted, it would not fare any better because its action for cancellation of assessments had already prescribed since its Petition was filed beyond the 180+30-day period stated in Section 228.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denying the motion, this Court held that it could not anymore “claim that the disputed assessment is not yet final as it remained unacted upon by the Commissioner; that it can still await the final decision of the Commissioner and thereafter appeal the same to the Court of Tax Appeals.” Since it had availed of the first option by filing a petition for review because of the Commissioner’s inaction, although late, it could no longer resort to the second option.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation referred to Rule 4, Section 3(a)(2) of the 2005 RRCTA, or the 2005 CTA Rules, which provides:
Section 3. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions. — The Court in Divisions shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
. . . .
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action: Provided, that in case of disputed assessments, the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case to the Court and does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the tax case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the one hundred eighty day-period abovementioned, the taxpayer may appeal such final decision to the Court under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided, still further, that in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review with the Court prior to the expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In Lascona Land Co., Inc. v. CIR,[173] this Court reaffirmed Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, viz:
In arguing that the assessment became final and executory by the sole reason that petitioner failed to appeal the inaction of the Commissioner within 30 days after the 180-day reglementary period, respondent, in effect, limited the remedy of Lascona, as a taxpayer, under Section 228 of the NIRC to just one, that is — to appeal the inaction of the Commissioner on its protested assessment after the lapse of the 180-day period. This is incorrect.
. . . .
[W]hen the law provided for the remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did not intend to limit it to a single remedy of filing of an appeal after the lapse of the 180-day prescribed period. Precisely, when a taxpayer protested an assessment, he naturally expects the CIR to decide either positively or negatively. A taxpayer cannot be prejudiced if he chooses to wait for the final decision of the CIR on the protested assessment. More so, because the law and jurisprudence have always contemplated a scenario where the CIR will decide on the protested assessment.
This Court, nonetheless, stressed that these two (2) options of the taxpayer, i.e., to (1) file a petition for review before the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) to await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment and appeal this final decision to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of it, “are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the other.”
Rule 4, Section 3(a)(2) of the 2005 CTA Rules clarifies Section 7(a)(2) of RA No. 9282 by stating that the “deemed a denial” rule is only for the “purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal” in case of inaction of the Commissioner and “does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner.” Furthermore, the same provision clarifies that the taxpayer may choose to wait for the final decision of the Commissioner even beyond the 180-day period, and appeal from it.
The 2005 CTA Rules were approved by the Court En Banc on November 22, 2005, in A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, pursuant to its constitutional rule-making authority. Under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
. . . .
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)
In Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties, Inc. [418 Phil. 176 (2001)], this Court held:
There is no controversy on the principle that the right to appeal is statutory. However, the mode or manner by which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure which may be altered and modified provided that vested rights are not impaired. The Supreme Court is bestowed by the Constitution with the power and prerogative, inter alia, to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, as well as to review rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, which, however, shall remain in force until disapproved by the Supreme Court. This power is constitutionally enshrined to enhance the independence of the Supreme Court. (Citation omitted)
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals [772 Phil. 672 (2015)] elucidated that while Congress has the authority to establish the lower courts, including the CTA, and to define, prescribe, and apportion their jurisdiction, the authority to promulgate rules of procedure is exclusive to this Court:
A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.”
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Section 228 of the Tax Code and Section 7 of RA No. 9282 should be read in conjunction with Rule 4, Section 3(a)(2) of the 2005 CTA Rules. In other words, the taxpayer has the option to either elevate the case to the CTA if the Commissioner does not act on his or her protest, or to wait for the Commissioner to decide on his or her protest before he or she elevates the case to the CTA. This construction is reasonable considering that Section 228 states that the decision of the Commissioner not appealed by the taxpayer becomes final, executory, and demandable.
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Presumed correct.
Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, and all presumptions are in favor of the correctness of a tax assessment unless proven otherwise.
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The appealable decision to the CTA on a disputed assessment.
A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment. The determination on whether or not a demand letter is final is conditioned upon the language used or the tenor of the letter being sent to the taxpayer.
We laid down the rule that the CIR should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment, thus:
. . . we deem it appropriate to state that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language whenever his action on an assessment questioned by a taxpayer constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, as contemplated by Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. On the basis of his statement indubitably showing that the Commissioner’s communicated action is his final decision on the contested assessment, the aggrieved taxpayer would then be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. Without needless difficulty, the taxpayer would be able to determine when his right to appeal to the tax court accrues.
The rule of conduct would also obviate all desire and opportunity on the part of the taxpayer to continually delay the finality of the assessment – and, consequently, the collection of the amount demanded as taxes – by repeated requests for recomputation and reconsideration. On the part of the Commissioner, this would encourage his office to conduct a careful and thorough study of every questioned assessment and render a correct and definite decision thereon in the first instance. This would also deter the Commissioner from unfairly making the taxpayer grope in the dark and speculate as to which action constitutes the decision appealable to the tax court. Of greater import, this rule of conduct would meet a pressing need for fair play, regularity, and orderliness in administrative action.
In this case, the letter of demand dated January 24, 1991, unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the BIR on petitioner’s request for reconsideration when it reiterated the tax deficiency assessments due from petitioner, and requested its payment. Failure to do so would result in the “issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce its collection without further notice.” In addition, the letter contained a notation indicating that petitioner’s request for reconsideration had been denied for lack of supporting documents.
The above conclusion finds support in CIR v. Ayala Securities Corporation (No. L-24985, 31 March 1976), where we held:
The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view of the Court, is tantamount to a denial of the reconsideration or [respondent corporation’s]…protest o[f] the assessment made by the petitioner, considering that the said letter [was] in itself a reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the settlement of the assessment already made, and for the immediate payment of the sum of P758,687.04 in spite of the vehement protest of the respondent corporation on April 21, 1961. This certainly is a clear indication of the firm stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of the disputed assessment… This being so, the said letter amount[ed] to a decision on a disputed or protested assessment, and, there, the court a quo did not err in taking cognizance of this case.
Similarly, in Surigao Electric Co., Inc v. Court of Tax Appeals (L-25289, 28 June 1974), and in CIR v. Union Shipping Corporation (G.R. No. 66160, 21 May 1990), we held:
“. . . In this letter, the commissioner not only in effect demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it failed to pay, the said commissioner would be constrained to enforce the collection thereof by means of the remedies provided by law. The tenor of the letter, specifically the statement regarding the resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicate[d] the final nature of the determination made by the commissioner of the petitioner’s deficiency franchise tax liability.”
The demand letter received by petitioner verily signified a character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of the request for reconsideration. As correctly held by the CTA, “while the denial of the protest was in the form of a demand letter, the notation in the said letter making reference to the protest filed by petitioner clearly shows the intention of the respondent to make it as [his] final decision.”
*******
In this case, Avon opted to wait for the final decision of the Commissioner on its protest filed on May 9, 2003.
This Court holds that the Collection Letter dated July 9, 2004 constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner that is appealable to the CTA. The Collection Letter dated July 9, 2004 demanded from Avon the payment of the deficiency tax assessments with a warning that should it fail to do so within the required period, summary administrative remedies would be instituted without further notice. The Collection Letter was purportedly based on the May 27, 2004 Memorandum of the Revenue Officers stating that Avon “failed to submit supporting documents within 60-day period.” This Collection Letter demonstrated a character of finality such that there can be no doubt that the Commissioner had already made a conclusion to deny Avon’s request and she had the clear resolve to collect the subject taxes.
Avon received the Collection Letter on July 14, 2004. Hence, Avon’s appeal to the CTA filed on August 13, 2004 was not time-barred.
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Mandate in rendering a decision on a disputed assessment by the CIR.
The key to effective communication is clarity.
The CIR as well as his duly authorized representative must indicate clearly and unequivocally to the taxpayer whether an action constitutes a final determination on a disputed assessment. Words must be carefully chosen in order to avoid any confusion that could adversely affect the rights and interest of the taxpayer.
*******
On a final note, the Commissioner is reminded of her duty enunciated in Section 3.1.6 of RR No. 12-99 to render a final decision on disputed assessment. Section 228 of the Tax Code requires taxpayers to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within 30 days from receipt of the assessment. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required prior to resort to the CTA precisely to give the Commissioner the opportunity to “re-examine its findings and conclusions” and to decide the Issues raised within her competence.
Paat v. Court of Appeals [334 Phil. 146 (1997)] wrote:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Taxpayers cannot be left in quandary by the Commissioner’s inaction on the protested assessment. It is imperative that the taxpayers are informed of the Commissioner’s action for them to take proper recourse to the CTA at the opportune time. Furthermore, this Court had time and again expressed the dictum that “the Commissioner should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his [or her] final determination of the disputed assessment. That procedure is demanded by the pressing need for fair play, regularity and orderliness in administrative action.”
While indeed the government has an interest in the swift collection of taxes, its assessment and collection should be exercised justly and fairly, and always in strict adherence to the requirements of the law and of the BIR’s own rules.
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The appealable decision to the CTA; Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Appealable to the Tax Court is a decision that refers not to the assessment itself, but to one made on the protest against such assessment. The CIR’s action in response to a taxpayer’s request for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the assessment constitutes the decision, the receipt of which will start the 30-day period for appeal.
Section 229 (now Section 228, NIRC of 1997) does not prevent a taxpayer from exhausting administrative remedies by filing a request for reconsideration, then a request for reinvestigation. Furthermore, under Section 7(1) of RA 1125, as amended, the Tax Court exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review not the assessments themselves, but the decisions involving disputed ones arising under the NIRC.
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An exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies: Estoppel on the part of the BIR.
A careful reading of the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices leads us to agree with petitioner that the instant case is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e., estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned.
In the case of Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission [105 Phil. 377 (1959)], the respondent contended that before filing a petition with the court, petitioner should have first exhausted all administrative remedies by appealing to the Office of the President. However, we ruled that respondent was estopped from invoking the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies considering that in its Resolution, it said, “The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse”. The statement of the respondent in said case led the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.
Similarly, in this case, we find the CIR estopped from claiming that the filing of the Petition for Review was premature because petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
The Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices reads:
Based on your letter-protest dated May 26, 2004, you alleged the following:
1. That the said assessment has already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 203 of the Tax Code.
2. That since the exemption of FCDUs from all taxes found in the Old Tax Code has been deleted, the wording of Section 28(A)(7)(b) discloses that there are no other taxes imposable upon FCDUs aside from the 10% Final Income Tax.
Contrary to your allegation, the assessments covering GRT and DST for taxable year 2001 has not prescribed for [sic] simply because no returns were filed, thus, the three year prescriptive period has not lapsed.
With the implementation of the CTRP, the phrase “exempt from all taxes” was deleted. Please refer to Section 27(D)(3) and 28(A)(7) of the new Tax Code. Accordingly, you were assessed for deficiency gross receipts tax on onshore income from foreign currency transactions in accordance with the rates provided under Section 121 of the said Tax Code. Likewise, deficiency documentary stamp taxes was [sic] also assessed on Loan Agreements, Bills Purchased, Certificate of Deposits and related transactions pursuant to Sections 180 and 181 of NIRC, as amended.
The 25% surcharge and 20% interest have been imposed pursuant to the provision of Section 248(A) and 249(b), respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
It is requested that the above deficiency tax be paid immediately upon receipt hereof, inclusive of penalties incident to delinquency. This is our final decision based on investigation. If you disagree, you may appeal this final decision within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, otherwise said deficiency tax assessment shall become final, executory and demandable. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears from the foregoing demand letter that the CIR has already made a final decision on the matter and that the remedy of petitioner is to appeal the final decision within 30 days.
In Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, we considered the language used and the tenor of the letter sent to the taxpayer as the final decision of the CIR.
In this case, records show that petitioner disputed the PAN but not the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices. Nevertheless, we cannot blame petitioner for not filing a protest against the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices since the language used and the tenor of the demand letter indicate that it is the final decision of the respondent on the matter. We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate, in a clear and unequivocal language, whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final determination thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the tax court accrues. Viewed in the light of the foregoing, respondent is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a final decision.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that in the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices, respondent used the word “appeal” instead of “protest”, “reinvestigation”, or “reconsideration”. Although there was no direct reference for petitioner to bring the matter directly to the CTA, it cannot be denied that the word “appeal” under prevailing tax laws refers to the filing of a Petition for Review with the CTA. As aptly pointed out by petitioner, under Section 228 of the NIRC, the terms “protest”, “reinvestigation” and “reconsideration” refer to the administrative remedies a taxpayer may take before the CIR, while the term “appeal” refers to the remedy available to the taxpayer before the CTA. Section 9 of RA 9282, amending Section 11 of RA 1125, likewise uses the term “appeal” when referring to the action a taxpayer must take when adversely affected by a decision, ruling, or inaction of the CIR. As we see it then, petitioner in appealing the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to the CTA merely took the cue from respondent. Besides, any doubt in the interpretation or use of the word “appeal” in the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices should be resolved in favor of petitioner, and not the respondent who caused the confusion.
To be clear, we are not disregarding the rules of procedure under Section 228 of the NIRC, as implemented by Section 3 of BIR RR No. 12-99. It is the Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice that must be administratively protested or disputed within 30 days, and not the PAN. Neither are we deviating from our pronouncement in St. Stephen’s Chinese Girl’s School v. Collector of Internal Revenue [104 Phil. 314 (1958)], that the counting of the 30 days within which to institute an appeal in the CTA commences from the date of receipt of the decision of the CIR on the disputed assessment, not from the date the assessment was issued.
What we are saying in this particular case is that, the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices which was not administratively protested by the petitioner can be considered a final decision of the CIR appealable to the CTA because the words used, specifically the words “final decision” and “appeal”, taken together led petitioner to believe that the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices was in fact the final decision of the CIR on the letter-protest it filed and that the available remedy was to appeal the same to the CTA.
We note, however, that during the pendency of the instant case, petitioner availed of the provisions of RR No. 30-2002 and its implementing RMO by submitting an offer of compromise for the settlement of the GRT, DST and VAT for the period 1998-2003, as evidenced by a Certificate of Availment dated November 21, 2007. Accordingly, there is no reason to reinstate the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7062.
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The appealable decision to the CTA; Instance when a Final Notice Before Seizure (FNBS) is considered as the CIR’s final decision.
A final demand letter from the BIR, reiterating to the taxpayer the immediate payment of a tax deficiency assessment previously made, is tantamount to a denial of the taxpayer’s request for reconsideration. Such letter amounts to a final decision on a disputed assessment and is thus appealable to the CTA.
In the normal course, the revenue district officer sends the taxpayer a notice of delinquent taxes, indicating the period covered, the amount due including interest, and the reason for the delinquency. If the taxpayer disagrees with or wishes to protest the assessment, it sends a letter to the BIR indicating its protest, stating the reasons therefor, and submitting such proof as may be necessary. That letter is considered as the taxpayer’s request for reconsideration of the delinquent assessment. After the request is filed and received by the BIR, the assessment becomes a disputed assessment on which it must render a decision. That decision is appealable to the CTA for review.
Prior to the decision on a disputed assessment, there may still be exchanges between the CIR and the taxpayer. The former may ask clarificatory questions or require the latter to submit additional evidence. However, the CIR’s position regarding the disputed assessment must be indicated in the final decision. It is this decision that is properly appealable to the CTA for review.
Indisputably, respondent received an assessment letter dated February 9, 1990, stating that it had delinquent taxes due; and it subsequently filed its motion for reconsideration on March 23, 1990. In support of its request for reconsideration, it sent to the CIR additional documents on April 18, 1990. The next communication respondent received was already the FNBS dated November 10, 1994.
In the light of the above facts, the FNBS cannot but be considered as the commissioner’s decision disposing of the request for reconsideration filed by respondent, who received no other response to its request. Not only was the Notice the only response received; its content and tenor supported the theory that it was the CIR’s final act regarding the request for reconsideration. The very title expressly indicated that it was a final notice prior to seizure of property. The letter itself clearly stated that respondent was being given “this LAST OPPORTUNITY” to pay; otherwise, its properties would be subjected to distraint and levy. How then could it have been made to believe that its request for reconsideration was still pending determination, despite the actual threat of seizure of its properties?
Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that a final demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ayala Securities Corporation (70 SCRA 204, 31 March 1976), this Court held:
“The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view of the Court, is tantamount to a denial of the reconsideration or [respondent corporation’s] x x x protest o[f] the assessment made by the petitioner, considering that the said letter [was] in itself a reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the settlement of the assessment already made, and for the immediate payment of the sum of P758,687.04 in spite of the vehement protest of the respondent corporation on April 21, 1961. This certainly is a clear indication of the firm stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of the disputed assessment, in view of the continued refusal of the respondent corporation to execute the waiver of the period of limitation upon the assessment in question.
This being so, the said letter amount[ed] to a decision on a disputed or protested assessment and, there, the court a quo did not err in taking cognizance of this case.”
Similarly, in Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals (57 SCRA 523, 28 June 1974) and again in CIR v. Union Shipping Corp. (185 SCRA 547, 21 May 1990), we ruled:
“x x x. The letter of demand dated April 29, 1963 unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the commissioner on the petitioner’s several requests for reconsideration and recomputation. In this letter the commissioner not only in effect demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it failed to pay, the said commissioner would be constrained to enforce the collection thereof by means of the remedies provided by law. The tenor of the letter, specifically the statement regarding the resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicate[d] the final nature of the determination made by the commissioner of the petitioner’s deficiency franchise tax liability.”
As in CIR v. Union Shipping (supra), petitioner failed to rule on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent, but simply continued to demand payment of the latter’s alleged tax delinquency. Thus, the Court reiterated the dictum that the BIR should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes final action on a disputed assessment. The object of this policy is to avoid repeated requests for reconsideration by the taxpayer, thereby delaying the finality of the assessment and, consequently, the collection of the taxes due. Furthermore, the taxpayer would not be groping in the dark, speculating as to which communication or action of the BIR may be the decision appealable to the tax court.
In the instant case, the second notice received by private respondent verily indicated its nature – that it was final. Unequivocably, therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of the request for reconsideration.
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When the Algue case is not in point.
Commissioner v. Algue (158 SCRA 9, 17 February 1988) is not in point here. In that case, the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, issued to the taxpayer without any categorical ruling on its request for reconsideration, was not deemed equivalent to a denial of the request. Because such request could not in fact be found in its records, the BIR cannot be presumed to have taken it into consideration. The request was considered only when the taxpayer gave a copy of it, duly stamp-received by the BIR. Hence, the Warrant was deemed premature.
In the present case, petitioner does not deny receipt of private respondent’s protest letter. As a matter of fact, it categorically relates the following in its “Statement of Relevant Facts”:
“3. On March 23, 1990, respondent ICC wrote the CIR requesting for a reconsideration of the assessment on the ground that there was an error committed in the computation of interest and that there were expenses which were disallowed (Ibid., pp. 296-311).
“4. On April 2, 1990, respondent ICC sent the CIR additional documents in support of its protest/reconsideration. The letter was received by the BIR on April 18, 1990. Respondent ICC further executed a Waiver of Statute of Limitation (dated April 17, 1990) whereby it consented to the BIR to assess and collect any taxes that may be discovered in the process of reinvestigation, until April 3, 1991 (Ibid., pp. 296-311). A copy of the waiver is hereto attached as Annex `C’.”
Having admitted as a fact private respondent’s request for reconsideration, petitioner must have passed upon it prior to the issuance of the FNBS.
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Implications of a valid assessment.
Considering that the October 28, 1988 notices were valid assessments, BPI should have protested the same within 30 days from receipt thereof. The December 10, 1988 reply it sent to the CIR did not qualify as a protest since the letter itself stated that “[a]s soon as this is explained and clarified in a proper letter of assessment, we shall inform you of the taxpayer’s decision on whether to pay or protest the assessment.” Hence, by its own declaration, BPI did not regard this letter as a protest against the assessments. As a matter of fact, BPI never deemed this a protest since it did not even consider the October 28, 1988 notices as valid or proper assessments.
The inevitable conclusion is that BPI’s failure to protest the assessments within the 30-day period provided in the former Section 270 meant that they became final and unappealable. Thus, the CTA correctly dismissed BPI’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. BPI was, from then on, barred from disputing the correctness of the assessments or invoking any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the merits. Not only that. There arose a presumption of correctness when BPI failed to protest the assessments:
Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty to prove otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of duties, an assessment duly made by a Bureau of Internal Revenue examiner and approved by his superior officers will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments.
Even if we considered the December 10, 1988 letter as a protest, BPI must nevertheless be deemed to have failed to appeal the CIR’s final decision regarding the disputed assessments within the 30-day period provided by law. The CIR, in his May 8, 1991 response, stated that it was his “final decision … on the matter.” BPI therefore had 30 days from the time it received the decision on June 27, 1991 to appeal but it did not. Instead it filed a request for reconsideration and lodged its appeal in the CTA only on February 18, 1992, way beyond the reglementary period. BPI must now suffer the repercussions of its omission. We have already declared that:
… the [CIR] should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language whenever his action on an assessment questioned by a taxpayer constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, as contemplated by Sections 7 and 11 of [RA 1125], as amended. On the basis of his statement indubitably showing that the Commissioner’s communicated action is his final decision on the contested assessment, the aggrieved taxpayer would then be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. Without needless difficulty, the taxpayer would be able to determine when his right to appeal to the tax court accrues.
The rule of conduct would also obviate all desire and opportunity on the part of the taxpayer to continually delay the finality of the assessment — and, consequently, the collection of the amount demanded as taxes — by repeated requests for recomputation and reconsideration. On the part of the [CIR], this would encourage his office to conduct a careful and thorough study of every questioned assessment and render a correct and definite decision thereon in the first instance. This would also deter the [CIR] from unfairly making the taxpayer grope in the dark and speculate as to which action constitutes the decision appealable to the tax court. Of greater import, this rule of conduct would meet a pressing need for fair play, regularity, and orderliness in administrative action. (emphasis supplied)
Either way (whether or not a protest was made), we cannot absolve BPI of its liability under the subject tax assessments.
We realize that these assessments (which have been pending for almost 20 years) involve a considerable amount of money. Be that as it may, we cannot legally presume the existence of something which was never there. The state will be deprived of the taxes validly due it and the public will suffer if taxpayers will not be held liable for the proper taxes assessed against them:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for without taxes, the government can neither exist nor endure. A principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power derives its source from the very existence of the state whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public interest and common good. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
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When the assessment is already final, the CTA should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
We note that indeed on December 10, 1987, petitioner received the BIR’s assessment notices. On January 12, 1988, petitioner protested the 1983 and 1984 assessments and requested for a reinvestigation. From December 10, 1987 to January 12, 1988, thirty-three days had lapsed. Thereafter petitioner may no longer dispute the correctness of the assessments. Hence, in our view, the CTA correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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When the assessment cannot be considered as final, executory and demandable.
Section 228 of the Tax Code provides the remedy to dispute a tax assessment within a certain period of time. It states that an assessment may be protested by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within 30 days from receipt of the assessment by the taxpayer. Within 60 days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
In this case, respondent received the tax assessment on 3 January 2002 and it had until 2 February 2002 to submit its protest. On 1 February 2002, respondent submitted its protest and attached the GIS and Balance Sheet as of 31 December 1998. Respondent explained that it received P800,000 as a deposit with the possibility of applying the same as payment for the future issuance of capital stock.
Within 60 days from the filing of protest or until 2 April 2002, respondent should submit relevant supporting documents. Respondent, having submitted the supporting documents together with its protest, did not present additional documents anymore.
In a letter dated 12 March 2002, petitioner requested respondent to present proof of payment of DST on subscription. In a letter-reply, respondent stated that it could not produce any proof of DST payment because it was not required to pay DST under the law considering that the deposit on subscription was an advance made by its stockholders for future subscription, and no stock certificates were issued.
Since respondent has not allegedly submitted any relevant supporting documents, petitioner now claims that the assessment has become final, executory and demandable, hence, unappealable.
We reject petitioner’s view that the assessment has become final and unappealable. It cannot be said that respondent failed to submit relevant supporting documents that would render the assessment final because when respondent submitted its protest, respondent attached the GIS and Balance Sheet. Further, petitioner cannot insist on the submission of proof of DST payment because such document does not exist as respondent claims that it is not liable to pay, and has not paid, the DST on the deposit on subscription.
The term “relevant supporting documents” should be understood as those documents necessary to support the legal basis in disputing a tax assessment as determined by the taxpayer. The BIR can only inform the taxpayer to submit additional documents. The BIR cannot demand what type of supporting documents should be submitted. Otherwise, a taxpayer will be at the mercy of the BIR, which may require the production of documents that a taxpayer cannot submit.
After respondent submitted its letter-reply stating that it could not comply with the presentation of the proof of DST payment, no reply was received from petitioner.
Section 228 states that if the protest is not acted upon within 180 days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the inaction may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period. Respondent, having submitted its supporting documents on the same day the protest was filed, had until 31 July 2002 to wait for petitioner’s reply to its protest. On 28 August 2002 or within 30 days after the lapse of the 180-day period counted from the filing of the protest as the supporting documents were simultaneously filed, respondent filed a petition before the CTA.
Respondent has complied with the requisites in disputing an assessment pursuant to Section 228 of the Tax Code. Hence, the tax assessment cannot be considered as final, executory and demandable.
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